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75 
Justice Scalia’s Jiggery-Pokery in Federal 
Arbitration Law 
David S. Schwartz
†
 
In his final year on the Court, Justice Scalia introduced the 
phrase “jiggery-pokery” into the United States Reports to 
criticize his majority colleagues for what he felt was 
manipulative statutory interpretation.
1
 “Jiggery-pokery” is not 
only a memorable phrase in itself, but is also emblematic of 
Justice Scalia’s style—both his lively writing style, and his 
penchant for criticizing his colleagues for judicial practices in 
which he frequently indulged himself. 
Though less well-known than his opinions in constitutional 
or administrative law, Justice Scalia’s contribution to federal 
arbitration law is a prime example of his own jiggery-pokery in 
statutory interpretation. Federal arbitration law comprises the 
largely judge-made doctrine under the aegis of interpreting and 
applying the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Justice 
Scalia’s impact in this area boils down to three recent and 
significant 5–4 majority opinions issued between 2010 and 
2013. The purpose and effect of these decisions has been to 
winkle unconscionability doctrine out of the law of arbitration 
contracts, and to establish, at least for now, a legal regime in 
which arbitration clauses can be used by corporate defendants 
to immunize themselves from class actions. These decisions 
display some serious “jiggery-pokery” and “pure applesauce”
2
: 
that is to say, reasoning that casts aside both doctrinal fidelity 
and logic to reach a desired result. 
 
†  Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin 
Law School. Copyright © 2016 by David S. Schwartz. 
 1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2500 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery . . . .”). 
 2. Another now-famous Scalia-ism from the same case. See id. at 2501 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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I. A LATE ENTRANT TO THE FIELD 
Over the past 50 years, the Supreme Court has decided an 
average of one FAA case every year.
3
 Yet the field of federal 
arbitration law remains something of a doctrinal backwater. 
Frequently characterized by dry procedural complexity and 
often involving business-to-business litigation that lacks plain 
consequences for the constitutional politics that most interest 
the Court and its watchers, FAA cases seem to have made even 
the Justices’ eyes glaze over. Yet FAA cases carry important 
implications for the enforcement of civil rights and consumer 
protection laws. To be sure, the Justices have often missed 
these implications, as can be seen from their repeated failures 
to identify them and from fragmented voting patterns that cut 
across the 5–4 conservative/liberal splits that normally 
characterize cases involving employee and consumer rights. 
Even Justice Scalia, whose antennae for opportunities to 
impose a policy agenda were as sensitive as anyone’s, 
demonstrated a lack of interest in this field for his first 20 
years on the Court. 
A. THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925 for the 
specific purpose of overruling a federal common law doctrine 
under which pre-dispute arbitration agreements—contracts or 
contract provisions to arbitrate future disputes—were 
revocable at will by either party at any time prior to the 
arbitration hearing; even arbitrators’ decisions were often 
voidable in court.
4
 The FAA, according to its legislative history, 
was intended to govern procedure in federal courts and to 
“place[ ] such agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as 
other contracts.”
5
 Thus, the FAA makes written arbitration 
agreements enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
6
 As the 
Supreme Court once said, “the purpose of Congress in 1925 was 
 
 3. See infra note 15. 
 4. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 70–75. 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 6. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016). 
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to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more so.”
7
 
As I have written elsewhere, “[t]he FAA was designed to 
enforce arbitration agreements entered into by parties who had 
substance-neutral and remedy-neutral reasons for preferring 
non-judicial, but binding, dispute resolution.”
8
 Had the 
Supreme Court confined its application of the FAA to this 
primarily business-to-business context, FAA doctrine would 
have remained limited in scope and largely obscure. But, as 
characterized by Justice O’Connor in 1995, “the Court has 
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent 
with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, 
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”
9
 Since the early 
1980s, the Supreme Court has recast what was intended to be a 
procedural statute governing arbitration clauses in federal 
court into a substantive-law “federal policy in favor of 
arbitration” that applies in both federal and state court, 
preempting contrary state laws. Moreover, the Court has 
mistakenly but consistently enforced pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses against consumers, employees and others bringing 
claims under statutes designed to protect them from 
overreaching by the very party demanding arbitration.
10
 Called 
“mandatory arbitration” by most commentators, I have argued 
that it is more appropriately called “claim-suppressing 
arbitration”
11
 because arbitration clauses drafted by regulated 
corporate defendants are designed and intended to suppress 
claims.
12
 
Two intertwined doctrinal strands in this area have had 
real political salience, and have produced the only liberal-
conservative 5–4 splits during Justice Scalia’s time on the 
Court. These, not coincidentally, are the cases that appear to 
have held the greatest interest for Justice Scalia. The first 
 
 7. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967). 
 8. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
IND. L. J. 239, 243 (2012); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
931, 994–95 (1999) (describing the history in detail). 
 9. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 10. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 89–110. 
 11. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 239–42. 
 12. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1247, 1264–83 (2009). 
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concerns the extent to which the FAA preempts state law 
contract defenses, most notably unconscionability doctrine and 
state consumer protection policies. The second concerns the 
extent to which the FAA permits enforcement of adhesive 
arbitration clauses that restrict class actions and diminish the 
effectiveness of laws designed to regulate the parties drafting 
those clauses. These two strands have come together in a long 
series of Supreme Court decisions that authorize claim-
suppressing arbitration.
13
 The Court has thereby transformed 
the FAA into a statutory authorization for what Professor Jean 
Sternlight has called “do it yourself-tort reform.”
14
 
B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S RECORD IN FAA CASES 
Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court overlapped with most 
of the FAA’s doctrinal developments. Since Justice Scalia’s 
investiture on September 29, 1986, the Court has, by my count, 
issued 33 majority opinions in FAA cases.
15
 Justice Scalia wrote 
eight of these majority opinions—nearly a quarter, and more 
than twice what might be considered his “fair share.” Yet, in 
his first 19 years on the Court, to the end of the 2005 term, 
Justice Scalia wrote just two of the Court’s 19 majority FAA 
opinions. Notably, he only dissented twice in the 33 arbitration 
cases over 29 years—a striking statistic, though one largely 
explained by his general agreement with the Court’s strongly 
consistent pro-arbitration, anti-regulatory trend in this area. 
Perhaps more suggestive is the fact that Justice Scalia wrote 
only one separate opinion in the 25 cases in which he did not 
 
 13. See generally Schwartz, supra note 8. 
 14. Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. 
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the 
Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 854 (2002) (arguing that class-
action-barring arbitration clauses are used by businesses as “do it yourself tort 
reform”). I apologize to Professor Sternlight for having previously borrowed 
her extremely apt phrase without proper attribution. 
 15. Thus, the count is necessarily approximate because some cases raise a 
question of judgment whether they involve precedential interpretations of the 
FAA or not. The Lexis search “Federal Arbitration Act and date(>1966)” 
yielded 58 cases, ending with DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. 136 S. Ct. 463 
(2015). Twelve cases predated 1986, the year of Justice Scalia’s investiture. Of 
the remaining 46 cases from 1986 on, I judged 9 hits to be false positives—a 
handful not construing or applying the FAA at all, and others merely referring 
to the FAA very tangentially. Four cases were per curiam opinions. This 
leaves 33 “majority” opinions. For the sake of simplicity, I have included in 
this count the sole plurality opinion in the group, Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Bazzle, in which Justice Scalia joined. See 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
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write the majority—his dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson,
16
 about which more will be said later. In other areas of 
the law, Justice Scalia was strongly inclined to have his own 
say, frequently in dissent of course, but also very often in 
concurring opinions or concurrences in the judgment. That he 
did not write a single concurrence in any arbitration case 
signaled his lack of interest in the field. 
2006 marked a pivotal year in Justice Scalia’s place in FAA 
doctrine. Justice Scalia’s two majority opinions before the 
October 2005 term were both unanimous “decisions not to 
decide” the cert question, decisions written in that muddy 
fashion the Court uses when there is no clear agreement on 
legal policy and the Justices agree to issue an opinion with no 
precedential value.
17
 However, starting with Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
18
 in spring 2006, Justice Scalia wrote 
six majority opinions out of 14 total FAA decisions by the 
Court. Five of the Scalia majority opinions issued pro-business 
rulings against consumer or antitrust interests, including all 
three of the anti-consumer 5–4 decisions involving a 
conservative versus liberal split. In that time frame, only two 
anti-consumer majority opinions were written by Justices other 
than Scalia.
19
 
In sum, it seems that Justice Scalia lacked any particular 
interested in the development of FAA doctrine in his first 19 
years on the Court, save for an abortive federalism interest 
expressed in his sole dissenting opinion in this area in Allied-
Bruce in 1995.
20
 Starting in 2006, however, he began to see the 
opportunity to develop a powerful anti-consumer direction in 
FAA cases, and took a much more active interest in the field, 
authoring a disproportionate number of majority holdings 
against consumer litigants. 
 
 16. 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. See PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Wright v. 
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 18. 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
 19. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (Thomas); DIRECTV, 
Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (Breyer). Two other anti-consumer 
decisions were issued per curiam in this time frame. Marmet Health Care 
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) (holding that a state 
law precluding pre-dispute arbitration of nursing home contracts was 
preempted); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) 
(applying Prima Paint to rule a contract void under a state law against non-
competes). 
 20. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S LEGACY IN FAA DOCTRINE 
Justice Scalia’s legacy for FAA doctrine can be discerned by 
examining the three anti-consumer majority opinions in 5–4 
cases, all delivered between 2010 and 2013. But first, it is 
important to view his only dissent, in 1995, which offers a 
principled counterpoint to his three pragmatic and result-
driven majority decisions. 
A. FEDERALISM AND FAA PREEMPTION 
Since most consumer protection law has arisen in the post-
Erie legal environment, it tends to be state rather than federal 
law. And because most claim-suppressing arbitration cases 
arise in the consumer context, a recurring question is whether 
the FAA preempts state consumer protection laws. In 
Southland Corp. v. Keating,
21
 the Supreme Court held for the 
first time that the FAA created substantive federal law that 
bound state as well as federal courts under the Supremacy 
Clause, and therefore preempted state law. The case involved a 
purely state-law suit in California state court by several 7-
Eleven convenience store franchisees against the parent 
corporation. The California Supreme Court denied the 
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis of a state 
statute that voided any term in a franchise contract requiring 
the franchisee to waive procedural or substantive rights. The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a six-Justice 
majority, Chief Justice Burger asserted: “In enacting §2 of the 
federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a 
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting 
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”
22
 
Three Justices vigorously dissented. Justice Stevens 
agreed that the FAA undoubtedly bound state courts and 
preempted state laws purporting to adhere to the old common 
law rule that arbitration agreements were revocable at will. 
However, he argued, it was not properly construed to preempt 
state contract laws and policies designed to regulate unequal 
bargaining power and protect parties from overreaching, that 
tangentially affected the enforcement of arbitration clauses. 
Justice O’Connor, joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, 
 
 21. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
 22. Id. at 10. 
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went further. The FAA was procedural, not substantive law, 
and did not bind state courts at all.
23
 
Justice O’Connor was right. The FAA is a procedural, not a 
substantive statute: as the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly 
acknowledged, arbitration agreements are “in effect, a 
specialized kind of forum selection clause,”
24
 in which a party 
compelled to arbitrate “does not forgo . . . substantive rights,” 
but “only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than 
a judicial, forum.”
25
 The FAA was never intended by the 
enacting Congress to apply in state court.
26
 The strange 
“substantive law” interpretation Southland places on the FAA 
makes that statute a unique and anomalous instance of a 
federal substantive law that creates no federal question 
jurisdiction.
27
 Moreover, the Southland Court ignored the 
serious constitutional objections to gratuitously interpreting 
the FAA to restructure the operations of state courts—that is to 
divert classes of cases from state courts into a private 
contractual dispute resolution system.
28
 
Justice Scalia was a member of the Court by the next time 
it took up this issue in 1995. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson,
29
 the Court was asked to overrule Southland in a brief 
submitted on behalf of 20 states. Instead, a 7–2 majority 
reaffirmed Southland and held that the FAA preempted an 
Alabama statute making pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
unenforceable. A reluctant Justice O’Connor joined the 
majority, citing statutory stare decisis concerns while 
 
 23. Id. at 25. 
 24. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 483 (1989). 
 25. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985). 
 26. See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory 
Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 18 (2004). 
 27. The Supreme Court has always held that FAA “does not create any 
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 
otherwise.” Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9; accord Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). That 
much is a correct interpretation of the FAA, which provides that arbitration 
agreements can only be enforced in federal court when, “save for such 
agreement, [the federal court] would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil 
action or in admiralty of the subject matter . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 28. See David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of 
Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2005) (arguing that 
the FAA as construed by Southland is unconstitutional). 
 29. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
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continuing to assert that Southland was wrong. In a dissenting 
opinion joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas reprised and 
developed the historical arguments from Justice O’Connor’s 
Southland dissent, concluding flatly that “the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply in state courts.”
30
 He 
brushed aside stare decisis concerns, arguing that reliance 
interests did not weigh against overruling Southland.
31
 
Justice Scalia filed his own brief dissent—his only separate 
opinion in an FAA case—stating that “Southland clearly 
misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act.”
32
 He argued that 
stare decisis did not prevent “correction of the mistake” of 
Southland, because the reliance interests on Southland could 
not have been strong and because Southland was so 
egregiously wrong: “Adhering to Southland entails a 
permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to 
adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes.”
33
 He concluded: 
I shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest 
on Southland. I will, however, stand ready to join four other 
Justices in overruling it, since Southland will not become more 
correct over time, the course of future lawmaking seems 
unlikely to be affected by its existence, and the accumulated 
private reliance will not likely increase beyond the level it has 
already achieved (few contracts not terminable at will have 
more than a 5-year term).
34
 
Had Justice Scalia been a truly influential voice on 
federalism principles, he might have been able to build a 
majority to overrule Southland in the Allied-Bruce case itself. 
None of the six majority Justices from Southland were still on 
the Court in 1995, but the three Southland dissenters—
Rehnquist, Stevens and O’Connor—were. When Allied Bruce 
was decided in January 1995, federalism concerns were no 
doubt salient in all the Justices’ minds. Allied-Bruce was 
argued in October 1994; one month later, the Court heard 
argument in United States v. Lopez,
35
 the case that would usher 
in the purported “federalism revival/revolution” of the 
Rehnquist Court. This might well have made Justices Kennedy, 
Rehnquist and O’Connor susceptible to a strong federalism-
 
 30. Id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 286. 
 32. Id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 284–85. 
 35. 514 U.S. 149 (1995). 
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based argument to overrule Southland. Whatever Scalia’s 
behind-the-scenes persuasive powers, they were not enough to 
overcome Kennedy’s general liking of arbitration and 
Rehnquist’s administrative concerns as Chief Justice for 
getting cases off the federal docket. And, to be frank, Justice 
Scalia was hardly an exemplar of principled decision-making 
who could shame his colleagues into adhering to an abstract 
principle at the expense of a desired result. 
True to his word, if not to federalism, Justice Scalia never 
again dissented from a case relying on Southland. In marked 
contrast, Justice Thomas has dissented in all four cases since 
Allied-Bruce in which the Court has applied the FAA in state 
court litigation.
36
 Meanwhile, Justice Scalia himself went on to 
become the Court’s leading spokesman for the “eviction of state-
court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of 
disputes”
37
—consumer protection cases. 
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARBITRATORS’ AUTHORITY 
A recurring problem in arbitration doctrine centers around 
the scope and limits of the arbitrator’s authority. There is an 
unavoidable gray area when it comes to distinguishing 
threshold “validity” questions to be decided by the court from 
“arbitrability” questions in which the arbitrator determines 
what substantive issues the parties contractually intended to 
arbitrate. Even so, the Supreme Court has turned this 
distinction into a confused mess.
38
 Justice Scalia exploited this 
confusion in a 2010 decision in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson,
39
 
which allows arbitrators to decide important questions of 
validity that affect their own financial interests. 
In Rent-A-Center, the plaintiff-employee, Jackson, sued his 
employer Rent-A-Center for race discrimination under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981. When Rent-A-Center moved to compel 
arbitration, Jackson argued that the arbitration clause was 
unconscionable under Nevada law. But the arbitration clause 
included a “delegation” provision stating that “[t]he Arbitrator 
. . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute 
relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement 
 
 36. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Preston v. 
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440 (2006); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
37.  Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 38. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 254–59. 
 39. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
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including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of 
this Agreement is void or voidable.”
40
 This raised the question 
of whether the unconscionability issue could be given to the 
arbitrator rather than to a reviewing court. If so, arbitration 
would be compelled despite an unresolved claim that the 
arbitration clause was unenforceable.
41
 
In a logic-defying 5–4 majority opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, the Court reversed, holding that the decision on the 
unconscionability of the arbitration clause was for the 
arbitrator.
42
 There is a problem in this position, both of logic 
and fundamental fairness. If an arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable, then the victim of the unconscionable contract 
never really agreed to arbitration at all—and there is no legal 
basis to authorize an arbitrator to decide anything affecting 
that party’s rights. To get around this problem, Justice Scalia 
had to apply the rule of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing. Co.
43
 There, the Court held that arbitration 
clauses were “severable” from the rest of the contract 
containing them; and therefore, a claim that a contract was 
procured by fraud had to be submitted to arbitration, unless 
there was a contention that the arbitration agreement was 
voided due to fraud “directed to the arbitration agreement 
itself.”
44
 Here, in Rent-A-Center, Justice Scalia extended this 
logic-straining doctrine to apply to an unconscionability 
argument—and gave it a wrenching twist. Jackson’s 
arbitration agreement with Rent-A-Center, he asserted, is a 
contract complete in itself: the “delegation provision,” 
delegating the decision of unconscionability vel non to the 
arbitrator, is an independent provision within that arbitration 
contract. Under Prima Paint, he asserted, the delegation clause 
is severable and enforceable when what is being challenged is 
the unconscionability of the arbitration “contract” as a whole.
45
 
Therefore, the delegation clause stands, and the question of 
unconscionability must go to the arbitrator.
46
 
 
 40. Id. at 66. 
 41. Id. at 70. 
 42. Id. at 72. 
 43. See id. at 64; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395 (1967). 
 44. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402. 
 45. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72. 
 46. Id. 
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This jiggery-pokery cannot seriously be called “reasoning.” 
To begin with, it makes no sense to view a pre-dispute 
arbitration clause, promising to arbitrate disputes arising out 
of a contract, as a self-contained, stand-alone contract (so as to 
invoke the Prima Paint rule).
47
 Here, Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that the arbitration agreement was signed “as a 
condition of [plaintiff’s] employment”
48
—a direct concession 
that the arbitration agreement is part of the employment 
contract. Moreover, the delegation clause is not logically 
independent and severable from the arbitration clause, in the 
way that an arbitration clause is logically independent from the 
substantive deal around which the overall contract is built. 
Thus, there will never be occasion to challenge a clause 
delegating validity issues to the arbitrator without also 
challenging the overall validity of the arbitration clause; it is 
more or less a logical impossibility. And nothing in the holding, 
or underlying logic, of Prima Paint supports chopping up an 
arbitration clause into severable pieces in order to take validity 
questions going to the arbitration clause itself away from courts 
and reassigning them to arbitrators. 
Prima Paint was itself “a ‘fantastic’ and likely erroneous 
decision,” allowing a party that procures a contract by fraud to 
get the benefit of (the arbitration clause) part of its bargain.
49
 
Yet Prima Paint is far less indefensible than Rent-A-Center. 
Fraudulent inducement claims are fact-intensive inquiries 
going to the heart of the contract; these are not only the kinds 
of matters arbitrators have traditionally handled, but the 
Supreme Court was no doubt concerned that assigning such 
cases to the court would create a gaping exception to 
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Whatever might 
be said in defense of Prima Paint in its original context of 
fraud-in-the-inducement claims, the same does not apply to 
claims, such as illegality and unconscionability, asserting that 
the contract is voidable on grounds that are largely apparent on 
the face of the contract. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s Rent-A-Center opinion glosses 
over a glaring due process problem. The contract drafter wants 
 
 47. The only exception would be the rather fanciful situation in which two 
parties with no other contractual relationship simply agree to arbitrate all 
future disputes between them. 
 48. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 65. 
 49. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 
407 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
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the arbitrator to decide everything, and the arbitrator makes 
money by deciding he has the power to decide the validity of 
the delegation clause, which in turn permits him to uphold the 
validity of the arbitration clause and thereby make more money 
by conducting the arbitration on the merits. This appalling 
violation of basic due process norms—requiring the adhering 
party to submit a question to an adjudicator with a direct 
financial stake in deciding the question favorably to the 
contract drafter—has elsewhere been held to be a classic 
example of unconscionability.
50
 
Rent-A-Center also has ominous implications for state 
consumer protection law as applied to arbitration clauses. A 
delegation clause tailored to Rent-A-Center strips the court of 
power to review any threshold issues concerning validity. 
Courts will have no choice but to compel arbitration in every 
case, leaving it up to the arbitrators to determine how to 
respond to unconscionable and overreaching arbitration 
agreements. All the sorts of remedy-stripping arbitration 
clauses that have been struck down as unconscionable by 
courts will no longer be judicially reviewable in the first 
instance, and subject only to the very limited judicial review 
allowable for arbitration awards.
51
 
C. CLASS ACTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Justice Scalia’s most significant contribution (if that is the 
word) to claim-suppressing arbitration law has been in two 
opinions empowering adhesion contract drafters to immunize 
themselves from class actions. 
1. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
A longstanding question in arbitration law has been 
whether an arbitration clause could be used to impose a 
contractual advance waiver of class action claims; or in other 
words, would a class action ban in an arbitration clause be 
deemed enforceable or not, or would its presence render the 
entire arbitration clause unconscionable?
52
 After years of 
 
 50. Cf. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (holding 
unconscionable a provision to name an arbitrator with financial ties to the 
contract-drafter). 
 51. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration 
Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 
49 (2003). 
 52. Professor Sternlight was the first scholar to offer a close examination 
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avoidance, and one dithering opinion, the Court finally 
confronted the question of the enforceability of a class action 
waiver in 2011 in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.
53
 The 
plaintiffs, California residents who claimed that they had been 
illegally charged thirty dollars in sales tax on cell phones that 
had been offered to them as “free,” filed a class action complaint 
in federal court in California, and the defendant AT&T 
Mobility (ATTM) moved to compel arbitration.
54
 The arbitration 
agreement banned class claims against ATTM and expressly 
stated that the arbitrators had no power to conduct class 
arbitration.
55
 Applying California law as required in a diversity 
case, the lower courts denied the motion to compel arbitration 
on the ground that the arbitration agreement’s class action ban 
made the arbitration agreement invalid under California 
unconscionability doctrine.
56
 The Supreme Court reversed in a 
5–4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, upholding the class 
action waiver, and holding that state law doctrines refusing to 
enforce arbitral class action bans as unconscionable are 
preempted by the FAA. 
The plaintiffs’ argument, which had convinced the lower 
courts, relied on the reasoning of Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court.
57
 There, the California Supreme Court had sensibly held 
that a class action ban (whether placed in an arbitration 
agreement or elsewhere) tends to work as an exculpatory 
clause, effectively immunizing the defendant from liability for 
widespread low-dollar-value consumer frauds whose stakes are 
insufficient to sustain claims by litigants individually; 
accordingly, class action bans were unconscionable under 
California contract law, whether or not in an arbitration 
agreement.
58
 This common-sense principle, that a class action 
may be the only way to meaningfully vindicate rights where the 
 
of this question sixteen years ago, in her prophetically-titled article. See Jean 
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 53. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). The Court was faced with that question and 
failed to resolve it. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 54. Brief for Petitioner at 9, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011) (No. 09-893). 
 55. Brief for Respondents at 3; Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893). 
 56. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 
2009). The Concepcion case was consolidated with the Laster case at this 
stage. See id. at 853. 
 57. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 58. Id. at 1110. 
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available damages are too low relative to the cost of litigating, 
had been long recognized by courts and commentators, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court.
59
 
Justice Scalia’s disingenuous majority opinion seemed 
crafted to avoid addressing this logic. Rather than considering 
whether a company’s self-immunization from class actions was 
an improper use of arbitration clauses, the entire analysis was 
structured around a different question: whether “[r]equiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration” and is thus preempted 
by the FAA under the doctrine of obstacle preemption.
60
 To 
frame the question as one involving the desirability of class 
arbitration, the opinion studiously ignored the fact that neither 
party to the litigation desired or sought classwide arbitration. 
The parties had assumed that the alternative to enforcing the 
class action ban and ordering individual arbitration was to 
strike the arbitration clause and allow the case to proceed in 
court as a (putative) class action. Thus, ATTM’s contract 
included a “blow up” clause providing that, if the class action 
ban were found unenforceable, the arbitration agreement as a 
whole would be “null and void.”
61
 ATTM thereby contractually 
guaranteed itself the right to defend any class action in court. 
The plaintiffs, for their part, filed their case in court as a class 
action, and reasonably assumed that under either California 
unconscionability doctrine or the “blow up” clause, the 
alternative to case-by-case compelled arbitration would be a 
judicial class action. In short, neither of the parties sought or 
desired class arbitration. 
Yet Justice Scalia failed even to consider the possibility 
that the case might proceed in court as a class action. The 
majority implied that an unconscionability rule against class 
action bans will be read as a rule “allow[ing] any party to a 
consumer contract to demand [class-wide arbitration] ex post.”
62
 
The Court simply does not acknowledge the existence of a rule 
that allows the consumer to demand class-wide litigation when 
there is an arbitration clause present. The majority took for 
granted that, despite the alleged unconscionability of using the 
 
 59. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); 
Sternlight, supra note 51, at 28–33. 
 60. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 61. Brief for Respondents at 3; Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893). 
 62. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348. 
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arbitration agreement as a class action ban, the arbitration 
clause would be enforced in some fashion. The only question 
was what that arbitration would look like, not whether the 
claims would go forward in court due to unenforceability of the 
arbitration agreement. 
In short, Justice Scalia framed the question as whether a 
party with an arbitration agreement, which would be deemed 
per se enforceable, could be forced to defend itself in class 
action arbitration. Justice Scalia proceeded to justify the 
Court’s negative answer by attacking the adequacy of 
arbitration as a procedure for handling class action cases. 
Arbitration procedures and arbitrators are not to be “entrusted 
with ensuring that third parties’ due process rights are 
satisfied.”
63
 Arbitration’s “absence of multilayered [judicial] 
review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”
64
 
And “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
litigation.”
65
 Ironically, these are the very arguments long 
advanced by pro-consumer arbitration critics against claim-
suppressing arbitration in general. 
“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires 
courts to honor parties’ expectations,” Justice Scalia wrote 
without irony.
66
 Yet, here the parties plainly expected that if a 
class action ban were held unconscionable, the parties would 
litigate a putative class action in court. The Supreme Court had 
never upheld a class action ban in an arbitration agreement, 
and longstanding public policy made contractual class action 
waivers unenforceable. Thus, ATTM had no reasonable ex ante 
expectation that its class action ban would stand up in court. 
To be sure, the defendant hoped it would—but nothing in the 
FAA previously required courts to honor defendants’ hopes. 
Justice Scalia suggested that the FAA does exactly that, 
revealingly noting that class arbitration was beyond the pale 
because it “greatly increases risks to defendants.”
67
 
2. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Justice Scalia’s last decision in the field of arbitration law 
came in 2013, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
 
 63. Id. at 350. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 351. 
 67. Id. at 350. 
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Restaurant,
68
 where he took aim at both class actions and at 
plaintiffs’ right to a forum to effectively vindicate their 
statutory rights. Various small businesses representing a 
putative plaintiff class of merchants who accepted American 
Express credit cards filed an antitrust suit in federal court, 
claiming that American Express exploited its monopoly position 
to extract excessive merchant fees. American Express moved to 
compel arbitration under an arbitration clause stating that: 
“[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be 
arbitrated on a class action basis.”
69
 The plaintiffs argued that 
the class action ban was unenforceable on the ground that it 
would render their statutory antitrust rights nugatory. The 
plaintiffs presented an expert affidavit asserting that “the cost 
of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims 
would be ‘at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might 
exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for an 
individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when 
trebled.”
70
 The district court granted the motion to compel 
arbitration, but the Second Circuit reversed and ordered the 
case to proceed as a putative class action in Court. The 
Supreme Court reversed.
71
 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that class action bans 
in arbitration clauses are enforceable, even where the cost of 
litigating an individual arbitration exceeds the potential 
recovery. Looking at antitrust claims in particular, Justice 
Scalia reasoned that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an 
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”
72
 
In enacting the treble damages remedy built into the Sherman 
Act, 
Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, 
beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring 
and remedying unlawful trade practice. But to say that Congress 
must have intended whatever departures from those normal limits 
advance antitrust goals is simply irrational. “[N]o legislation pursues 
its purposes at all costs.”
73
 
 
 68. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 69. Id. at 2308. 
 70. Id. 
 71. The Supreme Court had twice ordered the Second Circuit to 
reconsider its judgment in light of new Court decisions in other cases, and the 
Second Circuit reaffirmed its judgment both times. Id. at 2308. 
 72. Id. at 2309. 
 73. Id. (citation omitted). 
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This argument proves far too much, because it could just as 
easily support a construction of the Sherman Act precluding all 
class actions—not just those where an arbitration agreement is 
involved. 
Moreover, the assumption that the antitrust statutes 
intended certain “normal limits” from which class actions are a 
departure lacks any legal basis. What exactly are these “normal 
limits”—one plaintiff, one defendant and untrebled 
compensatory damages? In fact, treble damages are just as 
“normal” as punitive damages, which have long been permitted 
at common law and authorized in numerous statutes. And class 
actions are just as “normal” as cases involving multiple named 
plaintiffs or defendants under well-established joinder rules. 
What makes party joinder under Rules 19 and 20 more 
“normal” than class actions under Rule 23?
74
 
Justice Scalia’s effort to explain this point is unconvincing. 
Because the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted before 
Rule 23, he argued, it cannot be said that Congress viewed 
class actions as in any way essential to vindication of rights 
under the antitrust laws. This argument is simply fatuous. By 
enacting Rule 23, Congress recognized that in circumstances 
such as those present in the Italian Colors case, class actions 
are essential to vindication of any rights cognizable in federal 
court. As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, “[t]he policy 
at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome 
the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive 
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights.”
75
 It would have been pointless and unnecessary for 
Congress to amend every federal statute to provide specially for 
class actions when it did so in one fell swoop in Rule 23. 
Putting it another way, by enacting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, Congress redefined what is “normal” for 
litigation under all federal statutes. Where it intended that 
class actions would somehow represent undue “enforcement at 
all costs,” it could write a class action ban into a statute. 
Justice Scalia’s shifting what is “normal” litigation enforcement 
of a statute from the procedures in the Federal Rules to some 
undefined pre-1938 Hohfeldian ideal of a single plaintiff and 
 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 20, 23. 
 75. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. 
Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)). 
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single defendant is legally unwarranted and utterly 
unconvincing. 
Justice Scalia next argued that a litigant has no 
“entitlement” to class action enforcement of statutory rights 
because Rule 23 “imposes stringent requirements” that are 
often not met, even where the costs of individual claims exceed 
the potential recovery.
76
 This is merely a non-sequitur. The fact 
that a judge might deny a class action has nothing to do with 
whether a putative class defendant can deny a class action by 
writing an adhesion contract. Justice Scalia implicitly 
recognizes this problem in his argument when acknowledging 
that the plaintiffs are asserting “a [contractually] nonwaivable 
opportunity to vindicate federal policies by satisfying the 
procedural strictures of Rule 23.”
77
 Rather than addressing this 
argument, he simply finesses it by asserting, “But we have 
already rejected that proposition in AT&T Mobility [v. 
Concepcion].”
78
 In fact, the Court did not address the question 
there, as shown above. Indeed, the question that the Court has 
never answered is this: is a contract term simply prohibiting 
class actions enforceable? It is widely assumed that such a term 
would not be enforceable. And if not, why does it become 
enforceable by nesting it in an arbitration clause? 
Longstanding Supreme Court precedent had promised pre-
dispute arbitration agreements would be enforced against 
claims under private attorney general statutes, such as the 
antitrust, securities and antidiscrimination laws, only so long 
as the party compelled to arbitrate “does not [thereby] forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute” and “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum.”
79
 Justice Scalia brushed 
these precedents aside, mischaracterizing the repeatedly 
acknowledged limit on enforcement of arbitration clauses as 
 
 76. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628, 637 (1985); accord id. at 637 n.19 (noting that should an arbitration 
or other forum-selection clause “operate[ ] . . . as a prospective waiver of a 
party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would 
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”); 
see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009) 
(antidiscrimination laws); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 26 (1991) (same); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220, 229–30 (1987) (securities laws). 
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dicta.
80
 Justice Scalia’s answer to Justice Kagan’s stinging 
dissent, calling out the majority’s inconsistency with these 
precedents,
81
 was to circle back to his previous point: “The 
class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two 
contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to 
pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its 
adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938.”
82
 I was 
previously unaware that Justice Scalia’s elaborate methodology 
of statutory interpretation pegs the effectiveness of a statutory 
right to the state of the law before the adoption of the Federal 
Rules in 1938. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, Justice Scalia’s major federal arbitration 
law opinions render unconscionability and public policy 
defenses to arbitration clauses virtually non-existent, while 
allowing corporate defendants to immunize themselves from 
class actions by the expedient of nesting a class action waiver 
in an arbitration clause. To achieve these results, Justice Scalia 
had to engage in a fair amount of jiggery-pokery on behalf of 
the long-lived five-Justice conservative bloc. One looking for 
principled conservative jurisprudence in Justice Scalia’s body of 
work should probably look elsewhere than his arbitration 
decisions. Justice Scalia abandoned his much-touted federalism 
principles early on, and eventually found in FAA cases an 
opportunity to transform arbitration agreements into “do-it-
yourself tort reform.”
83
 While the phrase “jiggery-pokery” may 
well be long remembered, one can hope that Justice Scalia’s 
doctrinal jiggery-pokery in federal arbitration law will soon be 
overruled, gone and forgotten. 
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 81. See id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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